The Argus at KellyGang 3/6/1881 (2)

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(full text transcription)

Const Gascoigne giving evidence

To the CHAIRMAN - Witness did not know the “diseased stock agent." He thought the best plan of procedure would be for mounted constables to go out with as few encumbrances as possible - without pack-horses, with an opossum rug or swag, and with rifles, getting provisions where they could. The country was difficult to search, principally owing to the class of people living there. Bushrangers could not stay very long in the ranges without coming down for provisions. Witness believed there was a very bad feeling between the friends of the outlaws and the police now, and the former would be inclined to shoot the police if they had the chance. The condition of the district was not satisfactory. He and other constables who had assisted in the capture were in danger.

All members of the force in uniform in the district were in danger, but not more so now than during the search. He thought the police would have as much difficulty in suppressing outbreaks now as before. He did not contend that the men who had been most prominent in the search for and capture of the outlaws should be removed from the district. Good bushmen and horsemen were the best police for the district. Melbourne footmen were not of much use. Witness described the arrival of Superintendent Hare's party at Glenrowan and subsequent incidents in a manner similar to previous witnesses. Mr Hare, he stated, was wounded about 10 minutes after the first shots. Witness saw Kelly come out of the hotel and fire, and heard him subsequently say "Fire away, you ---- cocktails; you can't hurt me, I am in armour." Witness understood from a remark made when the boy Jones came out, that the people in the hotel were armed. Witness and Edward Kelly had several shots at each other from short distances.

Constable M'Hugh first told witness that there were 30 people in the hotel, and that they were armed. (Witness described very fully and graphically the attack on the hotel at Glenrowan, and the positions of the police round the hotel.) Saw Mr O'Connor about 8 o clock with Mr Sadleir, near the railway fence. Heard Mr Hare after he was shot tell Mr O'Connor to take his boys and surround the house. The last shot at the house was fired about half past 2 . Saw the priest go in at the front door. Saw the body of Joe Byrne brought out, and the bodies of the other outlaws. They had been moved before be saw them. They were lying on the Benalla side of the building. The armour of the bodies had been moved. The bodies were lying on the floor tolerably close together. Did not see Mr O'Connor at all after the prisoners came out; received no instructions from him. Witness only fired two or three shots at the building, but fired about 13 shots when Kelly came out. Witness never saw Mr Hare after he was wounded. Saw Mr Hare fire the first shot, but did not know whether he fired after. Did not hear Mr Hare tell his men not to fire until fired on. Witness did not see Mr O'Connor's boys do anything after Mr Hare s order.

To Mr O'Connor - Did not hear Mr Hare make any remark after be gave the order.

To the COMMISSION - There was no shot fired at the civilians when coming out of the hotel except at one man, who came out with a flag of truce. He could not see whether any shots were fired at them from the Wangaratta side of the hotel.

To Mr HALL - Witness had not heard of any special occasion of agents refusing to give information in the future, but he believed there would be some difficulty.

To Mr GRAVES - He believed it was better for the police to have acted for themselves, and gone about, instead of relying on agents. He thought it would have been better to have rushed the hotel than to burn down the place. He would have been inclined to recommend the former course if he were in charge. He did not think the police were provided with sufficient ammunition.

HM Chomley , acting chief commissioner of police, stated that he understood Mr O'Connor was to be paid by the Government when he was employed in the search after the outlaws twice the salary he received in Queensland . Did not know of any official document on the subject. The information on the point in the office was very vague. Mr Sadleir was not going back to the North-eastern district, and his services were not absolutely required in any other district. When he made the statement in his late report on the North-eastern district that disclosures before the commission had had a prejudicial effect, he made it on the strength of information given to him by Sadleir, Sergeant Steele and others, and on reports in the department. Was only in Benalla a few hours. [Letter from Mr Sadleir produced, dated April 22, 1881, stating that the sympathisers were on the alert to find out who the agents were that had given information to the police; that the police had to rely greatly on information supplied by agents, and that the proceedings of the commission had had the effect of disheartening the police.]

Witness had another report from Constable Graham, of Greta, stating that he had observed certain sympathisers drinking together there and that, from their conversation he was led to believe that another out- break was imminent, and that the sympathisers were anxious to discover who had given information to the police. Inspector Baber had reported that the police in the North-eastern district were unprepared for another outbreak, and that the police would in future be unable to get information from private persons, on account of the disclosures made before the commission. Sergeant Steele had reported the recent stealing of two saws, and that he heard they had been taken to be made into armour. Sergeant Whelan, of Benalla, told him that an outbreak might be easily kindled .Sergeant Steele said some of the sympathisers were great savages, but he did not think they would take to bushranging again unless "cornered for horse stealing." Thought that as private information was not likely to be received in the event of another out-break, Mr O'Connor's services should be obtained to take charge of the trackers. Mr O'Connor had been long with trackers, who required special handling.

Mr Sadleir told me that my recommendation that Mr O'Connor should he appointed would be most unpopular. Believe Mr O'Connor's name was sufficient to prevent a gang from breaking out again. The Kelly gang kept quiet while Mr O'Connor was there, and until he left the district; and as soon as the last outbreak took place, Mr O'Connor was the first sent for. Knew nothing of Mr O'Connor personally, never having seen him until he (witness) was going to Queensland to engage fresh trackers. Mr Sadleir thought Mr O'Connor's appointment would raise jealousy in the force. Believe that the trackers should be scattered about, and that five or six should not be kept together and go out in one party. It was desirable that a number of young constables should make them- selves acquainted with the district and people.

Considered Mr O'Connor's appointment would be an exceptional case. There was a rule that promotion should be made from the ranks. There were some good sub-officers in the force. Under the promotion from the ranks system a sub-officer could not expect promotion until he was past the prime of life, or, at all events, about 45 years of age. The inspectors ought to be young, active men.

The commission adjourned until 11 a.m. on Tuesday.

end

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