The Argus at KellyGang 13/1/1882
The principal lesson which is to be drawn from the Police Commission inquiry is the absolute necessity of placing the force under efficient command. It must be apparent to the student of the Kelly literature that, given vigorous and intelligent administration, there would in all human probability have been no serious outbreak to chronicle. The North- Eastern district had for years been the haunt of a criminal gang, but the Melbourne authorities ignored all warnings, and as the district got worse and worse, they allowed the police surveillance to become more and more inefficient. Mr NICOLSON inspected the district about a year before the first shot was fired, and his report, written at the time, and not in the light of after events, is conclusive as to neglect. At this time the station specially formed to watch and check the KELLYS and the QUINS and the other horsestealers had been broken up as "too expensive" – to quote Captain STANDISH'S phrase to the commission. Moreover, the next station, Greta, was in inefficient hands. One of the best senior constables in the force had been taken away, and a useless man had been put in his place.
Mr NICOLSON wrote – "Until the gang referred to is rooted out of this neighbourhood, one of the most experienced and successful mounted constables in the district will be required in charge at Greta. Sergeant STEELE, of Wangaratta, keeps the offenders referred to under as good surveillance as the distance and means at his command will permit. . . . But I do not think the present arrangements are sufficient." Mr NICOLSON'S opinion was that, without oppressing or worrying the gang, they should be closely watched, and whenever they committed any paltry crime they should be brought to justice, "the" object being to take their prestige "away from them." The men acquired their prestige, Mr NICOLSON says, “by their flashness," and minor convictions are as effectual as heavy sentences in "taking the flashness out of them;" and he pointed out how this system had been practically abandoned, consequent upon the abolition of Glenmore station and the changes at Greta.
At this time EDWARD KELLY was engaged in an ingenious and profitable trade. He stole horses wholesale, and drove them to confederates, the notorious BAUMGARTENS. The BAUMGARTENS drove the mobs across the Murray, where they were impounded by the police. The thieves then attended the pound sales, purchased the animals at a nominal price, and with certificates of ownership in their pockets, sold them afterwards at their leisure. The conviction of the BAUMGARTENS, consequent upon the report, was doubtless one of the circumstances which made EDWARD KELLY desperate. But still no steps were taken for the better administration of the district. When the outbreak occurred, one sub-officer an excellent man in his own department – had just come up after 20 years office work m Melbourne, and was of course unused to bush service ; another had never mounted a horse in his life; a third was notoriously broken up, and unfit for energetic action. Captain STANDISH'S heart appeals to have been in his office work in Melbourne . It is in evidence that he dealt promptly with the papers; but secretarial work of this nature is not all that is required of a chief commissioner. He must be something of a general also. And it is plain that as a general the chief commissioner failed to realise the situation in the North- Eastern district. It was a great mistake to allow notorious horsestealers to take up land in the wild back ranges, and found a sort of colony of their own there. The Lands department might have been addressed on the point, and, at any rate, common sense demanded that picked men and smart bush officers should be maintained in the neighbourhood. Captain STANDISH, it is clear, never grasped the position.
So it was after the tragedy at the Wombat. No doubt the situation was novel and difficult. No one could have forecast the career of the KELLYS. The horror of the civil population – a consequence of their murderous acts – which rendered the settlers unwilling to assist the police in any way, could not be anticipated. So with the advantages which the gang enjoyed of a knowledge of an almost inaccessible country, and the active sympathy of a scattered section of the community. Much had to be learned. Neither the public nor the police knew the difficulties of the task, and the need of a resort to special agencies, and light never came to the officer whom it should have reached first of all. The chief commissioner opposed every proposal to move out of the regular groove. The wisest step taken was to send for the trackers. Captain STANDISH opposed it, succeeded in postponing it for a time, and gravely assured the commission that the men had been a failure, although it is admitted that the fear of the trackers was what paralysed the outlaws. So with the steps taken to privately arrange with citizens to turn out in case of an attack upon a township, and to employ men of the Kelly class as agents or spies.
Captain STANDISH ridiculed them. He actually checked the rifle practice which was being given to the men who could not shoot, or who were inefficient, on the ground of its being "a waste of ammunition." There is one passage in the report of the commissioner which we can accept. It runs – "Finding that the police were utterly at fault as to their whereabouts, and were receiving no reliable information as to their movements that they were simply exhausting their energies in dragooning the districts on purposeless expeditions – the gang gained confidence, and settled down in the ranges. . . . When in July, 1879, Mr NICOLSON resumed charge of the pursuit, the prospect of capturing the outlaws appeared more remote than ever." From these remarks there is no occasion to dissent. If there had been no change of tactics the KELLYS might have gone on for ever, and brigandage might have become an institution in the mountains. On the other hand, if the precautions ultimately taken had been adopted in the first instance, the probability is that the career of the KELLYS would have been counted by months instead of by years. It is noteworthy that the end of the search found the head of the force not only no wiser, but no more vigilant, than the commencement. When he received the news of the murder of AARON SHERRITT on the Sunday afternoon, he proposed and arranged to start the trackers and the police the next morning. It was only the remonstrances of Superintendent HARE on the one hand, and Mr RAMSAY on the other, that led to a start being made on the Sunday evening.
We have said that there seems little reason to complain of the police officers subordinate to Captain STANDISH. Mr NICOLSON was astute and wary; Mr HARE had dash; Mr SADLEIR was cool and intelligent, and loyal to orders, and they formed a capable trio, the one officer correcting the deficiencies of the other. Instead of welding them together, how- ever, the chief commissioner soon had them –and Inspector O'CONNOR also – by the ears, Mr SADLEIR alone preserving his neutrality. Altogether, therefore, it must be said that the police force was not properly commanded during the Kelly crisis, and that thereby the break-up of the gang was delayed, while the force suffered in reputation accordingly. It must be admitted that to take charge of such a police force as ours, to supervise so large and so varied a colony, requires a man of marked ability. The task before the Government is to obtain the proper man, and we would advise Ministers to address themselves to this important problem with as little delay as possible, because undoubtedly the police force is losing efficiency under the present anomalous ad interim rule. Ministers should do the work of reorganisation themselves. They can scarcely trust to others the responsibility of the individual choice, and of the framing of rules and regulations which shall protect the force from the great, and we fear the growing, evil of political patronage. As to the Longmore Commission, sufficient has been said in previous articles to show the necessity of ignoring the report, and also of speedily dissolving that remarkable body.
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